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WHY WAGE-PRICE CONTROLS FAIL: A




The preeminent economic challenge of our time is to control
inflation while simultaneously reducing high levels of unemploy-
ment. Although in the first two quarters of 1976 inflation appeared
to have subsided to its normal Post-World War II, Pre-Vietnam
level, the cost of this temporary remission, namely serious reces-
sion in 1974-75, was politically unacceptable. Among lawyers and
economists in government the debate concerning methods for the
continued control of inflation narrows to whether inflation should
* Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals; A.B., economics,
Dartmouth College, 1964; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1967. At the age of 35, Justice
Neely is the youngest judge of an appellate court in the United States.
The author wishes gratefully to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of his
law clerk, Richard Ekfelt, B.A., Yale University, 1971, J.D., University of Virginia
School of Law, 1974, without whose efforts this article would have languished. Any
errors in economic theory, however, are exclusively those of the author.
I Despite considerable reservation, the Nixon Administration careened un-
daunted down the road to wage-price controls. C. Jackson Grayson, Jr., Chairman
of the Price Commission, in a statement before the Joint Economic Committee on
April 18, 1972, reported:
The Price Commission received a double mandate from the Presi-
dent, and subsequently from the Congress. One objective was to slow the
rate of inflation in the United States to a level with which American
productivity could keep pace. The second objective was to achieve this
without impeding the recovery of our ailing national economy to prosper-
ity and full employment.
Neither of these mandates was-nor can it be-separable from the
other. To gain a materially reduced cost of living by inhibiting the revital-
ization of the economy and increased employment would have been a
travesty . . . The twin objectives necessarily became one: achievement
of a dynamic full-employment economy, free from both the fact and the
psychology of inflation.
1
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be controlled through the monetary mechanism, i.e., through ex-
pansion and contraction in the money supply, whether it should
be controlled through direct governmental regulation of wages and
prices, or whether it should be controlled through some combina-
tion of both.
Even among those who have no philosophical objection to gov-
ernment intervention in private economic life, broad skepticism
exists concerning whether government is capable of regulating
wages and prices over any protracted period without seriously dis-
torting resource allocation by destroying the normal price structure
and creating artificial prices, shortages and reductions in the qual-
ity of goods. On the other hand, there is equal skepticism concern-
ing monetary remedies. It is generally agreed among earnest stu-
dents of the subject that the 1974-75 recession in America, with
unemployment exceeding 9%, was a direct result of the Federal
Reserve Board's attempt to control inflation by reducing the rate
of growth of the money supply.' This prolonged recession cast
doubts upon the efficacy of the monetary approach and conse-
quently appeared to make government control of wages and prices
an increasingly acceptable, if highly unpleasant alternative, de-
spite historical dissatisfaction with direct governmental control of
the market.
3
Our experience during the Nixon administration with wage-
price controls4 was disastrous,5 primarily because of broad-based
I Cleveland & Brittain, "A World Depression?"; Foreign Affairs, vol. 53, no.
2, Jan. 1975, at 223-241. For a West Virginia verification of the general theory, see
J. A. Stem, Annual Report of The Wood County Bank, Parkersburg, W. Va., April
1975.
In an open letter to President Nixon, Congressman Wright Patman (D-
Texas), Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee, stated that the
stabilization effort was not working as Congress had intended and the program was
being administered inequitably. He called on the President to use his authority to
overcome what he described as "massive shortcomings" in the program, among
which he listed: (1) the Cost of Living Council failed to comply with the intent of
Congress when it exempted interest rates from the controls; (2) the regulations were
too complicated to police; (3) rent regulations permitted large increases in rents;
and (4) the stabilization committees were not holding the number of public hear-
ings intended by Congress. New York Times, Mar. 11, 1972, at 32, col. 2.
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, Title II, Aug. 15,
1970, 84 Stat. 799 (Title 12, §1904 note) and Pub. L. No. 91-588, Title II, §201, Dec.
7, 1970, 84 Stat. 1468 (Title 12, §1904 note). The Act was extended five times before
[Vol. 79
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resistance from organized labor, who maintained that unionized
workers were shouldering the entire cost of wage-price stabiliza-
tion.' This article will argue that the process of equitably establish-
ing wage rates is so complex that wage-price controls cannot ade-
quately set wage rates throughout the entire economy without cre-
ating politically unacceptable inequities and market distortions
which will inevitably lead to rejection of all direct controls. Accord-
ingly, it will be argued, it is impossible to achieve an optimum
result in terms of low inflation, and near full employment, through
direct controls. Therefore, the appropriate approach is to work
towards a "second best solution" which imposes wage-price con-
trols in a limited number of industries, combines controls with the
restrained use of monetary tools, and lowers inflation to an ac-
ceptable, but far from perfect level.
This article is written for a law review instead of an economics
it expired on April 30, 1974. Economic Stabilization Amendments of 1971, Act Dec.
22, 1971, Pub. L. No. 94-210, §1, 85 Stat. 743; as amended by Act Apr. 30, 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-28, §§1-8, 87 Stat. 27-29.
Basically, the Act authorized the Chief Executive to issue orders and regula-
tions to freeze wages and salaries at levels not less than those existing on May 25,
1970. The Pay Board, created to implement the stabilization program, limited
annual salary increases to 5.5% and mandated Board approval for all salary in-
creases affecting 5,000 or more employees.
5 "[The wholesale price index, which frequently affects the consumer price
index, actually rose at a faster rate during the control period than during the pre-
control period. In December, 1972, during Phase II, the wholesale price index was
up 6.5% from the prior year; this compares with substantially lower year-to-year
gains of 4.0% in December, 1971 and 2.3% in December, 1970 when no controls were
in effect. Indeed, in December, 1972, the last full month of controls, wholesale
prices rose at a 1.8% level, the largest increase since 1951, and well above the pre-
control period." L. F. Doppelt, Phases I and II: A Look Backward, 24 MERCER L.
REV. 575, 576 (1973). It appears, however, that the consumer price index fared
substantially better.
I At the 1972 AFL-CIO winter meeting in Bal Harbour, Florida, top labor
leaders attacked the economic control program of the Nixon Administration calling
it "unfair" and "weighted" against lower-paid workers. The Executive Council of
the AFL-CIO issued a statement saying: "There is no fairness and equity in the
Administration's so-called program . . . . It is weighted against the workers and
their families, with the greatest burden on the backs of those at the bottom of the
economic ladder, who are least able to protect themselves." New York Times, Feb.
15, 1972, at 14, col. 3.
3
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journal primarily because, in one sense, it is fruitless to discuss
economics with economists. Compared to lawyers, economists
have little influence upon economic policy. If there is a "ruling
class" in the United States in the field of economics, it is composed
of lawyers and not economists. While economists testify before
Congress, economic legislation is written by the lawyer staff mem-
bers of Congressional Committees. Accordingly, lawyers involved
in legislative work should have some basic economic knowledge.
Ironically, it was probably this basic economic knowledge, as
contrasted with a more subtle and sophisticated grasp of the sub-
ject which precipitated the failure of the wage-price controls.7 All
of the evidence indicates, for example, that it was completely unin-
tentional that the Nixon administration placed the lion's share of
the burden of wage-price guidelines upon labor, rather than
equally dividing the burden among all factors of production in the
7 See, J. Smith, The Nixon Administration's Wage Controls: A Labor
Viewpoint, LAB. L.J. 532 (1973).
In making thousands of case-by-case decisions the Pay Board exer-
cised awesome power over the prosperity, and the very existence, of busi-
ness firms and local unions. However, this power was exercised without
any of the customary safeguards against arbitrary abuse of power, and
without any serious consideration of the need for such safeguards.
The first erroneous decision was that public control over the wage
determinations of labor markets could be exercised by persons inexperi-
enced in industrial relations-who were ignorant of the actual operation
of those markets they were assigned to control. This principle governed
the selection of ... virtually its entire staff, and the designation of its
field representative-the Internal Revenue Service.
The second erroneous decision flowed from the first. It was the deci-
sion to attempt to apply a rigid ceiling of 5.5% to all wage increases after
November 14, 1971. This decision ignored such realities of collective bar-
gaining as:
1. The need of some employee units to "catch up" with prior infla-
tion.
2. Traditional patterns of "tandem" bargaining.
3. The inequitable results for low wage earners.
4. Employers' needs for protection from loss of key employees to
higher wage competitors in tight labor markets.
The third erroneous decision was that a system of public control over
wages could be operated on a low-budget basis. The Pay Board staff never
reached 200, including secretarial personnel. Board members, except the
Chairman, were part-time. Lack of staff was probably the major reason
the Board could not provide due process when it was compelled to become
a case-deciding agency. Id. at 534-35.
4
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economy." Partisan propaganda would have it otherwise, and
would attribute the repressive nature of the wage-price guidelines
to a Republican plot to enhance management at the expense of
labor.' However, while one should not put it beyond a business-
' The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 provided stabilization of "prices,
rents, wages, salaries, dividends, and interest," and further contemplated that the
guidelines would "call for generally comparable sacrifices by business and labor as
well as other segments of the economy." Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 202,
203(b)(5), 12 U.S.C. 1904 (Supp. I1, 1973), amending 12 U.S.C. 1904 (1970).
By March of 1972, the labor sector had become so disillusioned with the
inequitable administration of the wage-price controls that three labor leaders re-
signed their appointments to the Pay Board: George Meany, President of the AFL-
CIO, I. W. Abel, President of the United Steelworkers of America, and Floyd Smith,
President of the International Association of Machinists, with Meany stating that
"[w]e will not be a part of the window dressing for this system of unfair and
inequitable government control of wages for the benefit of business profits." New
York Times, Mar. 23, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
In a prepared statement for the press commenting on the labor walk-out, the
AFL-CIO said:
Seven months of the Administration's so-called new economic pol-
icy-including four months of Phase H controls-have demonstrated that
it is nothing more than a device to make the average worker and con-
sumer both the victim and the goat, while the banks and big business pile
up increasing profits.
In the guise of anti-inflation policy, the American people are being
gouged at the supermarket and squeezed in the paycheck ....
The continuing, rapid rise of prices-such as February's [1972] 3.4
per cent yearly rate of increase in wholesale prices-reveals the emptiness
of the wage control program.
Slick rhetoric and double talk cannot hide these self-evident facts
from the American people. There is no fairness, no equity, no justice in
the Administration's economic program.
...[Economic controls are] an effort, at the expense of personal
and institutional freedom in this country, to avoid the measures, resisted
by big business and other selfish interests-such as constructive tax re-
form-most needed to correct the consequences of [its] failure.
Having as we do a deep disbelief in and distrust of the aims and
purposes of this Administration's economic and social policies, we intend
at the least to free representatives of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. from any grounds
for the inference of complicity in the formulation and execution of these
policies. Id. at 34, col. 1.
One day later, Leonard Woodcock, President of the United Auto Workers re-
signed from the Board, stating, "The Nixon game plan is to take worker money and
place it in the pockets of employers through both action and inaction." He dalled
the administration of the Pay Board a "shambles." "Collective bargaining is para-
lyzed. . . and the IRS is inept." "We leave because the whole Nixon control system
5
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oriented administration to engage in such a scheme, the objective
evidence leads to the reasonable inference that the wage-price
guidelines probably were not the result of any malevolent conspir-
acy.
0
The very simplicity of the wage-price program implies that the
theoretical framework of the legislation was based on the assump-
tion that labor unions normally pursue wage increases only to the
extent of increases in productivity because otherwise, a reduction
in employment would occur which union leaders proclaim to be an
unacceptable cost of higher wages. This basic and generally held
economic assumption, which has been standard fare in undergrad-
uate economics courses for the last fifty years" finds its origin in
classical marginal productivity theory which postulates that em-
ployers will hire labor up to the point at which the productivity
of the last worker hired is exactly equal to the income which that
worker generates for the firm. This statement, for the sake of brev-
ity, may be an over-simplification of the theory, but if it is true
that no union is willing to accept any significant reduction in em-
ployment of its members in return for higher wages, then the most
that a labor union can hope to accomplish in the area of wage
increases is to guarantee that increases in productivity will be
immediately translated into higher wages or non-economic bene-
fits. The wage-price control structure was perfectly consistent with
this traditional theory and failed because the theory fails.
One of the characteristics of the large, oligopolistic industries
such as steel, automobiles and tires is known as "price inelasticity
of demand". This simply means that the demand for such products
is relatively insensitive to price fluctuations. A much higher price
will not significantly decrease the amount of product purchased,
nor will a much lower price significantly increase the amount of
product purchased. It is generally recognized that in these oligo-
polistic industries both labor and management are capable of ex-
ploiting the inelasticities in the overall demand for the product,
is an abomination, and the U.A.W. cannot in good conscience maintain any connec-
tion whatsoever with the system." Id., Mar. 24, 1972, at 25, col. 1.
"* The stated purpose of Congress for enacting the guidelines was not to en-
hance the position of any particular segment of the economy but rather to establish
emergency measures to counteract the severe inflation that threatened the entire
national economy. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-1330, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 9-11 (1970).
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and like two competing and hostile bandits out of a Hollywood
Western, are together capable of conspiring in the joint enterprise
of brigandage at the expense of the consumer. It was exactly be-
cause of the increasing dominance of the oligopolistic sector of the
economy that wage-price guidelines apparently became necessary
during the early 1970s. Accordingly, the guidelines sought to en-
courage both labor and management to increase productivity'
2
while limiting the extent to which they could jointly exploit their
respective monopolies of either a labor supply or an oligopolistic
position in the product market.
Despite contrary theoretical arguments advocated by a major-
ity of economists,13 labor unions still steadfastly maintain that
they raise wages at the expense of profits. If the standard marginal
productivity theory is correct, and unions raise wages only in re-
sponse to increases in productivity (or in conjunction with man-
agement through exploitation of oligopolistic or monopolistic mar-
ket structures) then the theoretical framework behind the Nixon
administration's wage-price guidelines was perfectly reasonable.
However, if there are large numbers of situations in which wages
are raised at the expense of profits, then the wage-price guidelines
1 In his remarks to the National Association of Business Economists on Sep-
tember 7, 1972, C. Jackson Grayson stated:
As I said, we [the Price Commission and the Administration] delib-
erately tried to design a system that would minimize the distortions
common to most other control programs. This was the reason for clamp-
ing a lid on profit margins rather than on profits or prices. We wanted
management and labor to strive for productivity gains, instead of relying
on price increases as the route to higher profits.
He went on to say that the Administration's biggest concern and brightest hope for
achieving an end to the controls without a real danger of resurgent inflation was
American productivity.
A healthy, rising productivity rate, such as that which took place
during the first half of the sixties, helped mightily in holding prices and
unit labor costs stable during those years. But since 1966, the rise in U.S.
productivity, despite the stimulus of defense spending, has lagged behind
the rest of the world. In 1967, it hit almost zero percent of increase. And
yet, as all of us are very much aware, rising productivity is perhaps the
strongest non-governmental weapon with which to fight inflation. Evi-
dence of real, sustained productivity increase in America would, more
than any other single thing, encourage me to believe that the threat of
recurrent inflation was no longer serious.
11 See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS, 637-40 (5th ed.
1961), and G.F. BLOOM & H.R. NORTHRUP, ECONOMICS OF LABOR RELATIONS, 256-59
(6th ed. 1969).
7
Neely: Why Wage-Price Controls Fail: A Theory of the Second Best Approac
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1976
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
were justly attacked for not providing compensation from capital
or management in favor of unionized workers. Under any theory
which accepts labor's argument that unions redistribute wealth,
criticism of the guidelines is well justified because they permitted
unrestrained profit growth resulting from technological innovation
or economies of scale, while setting an arbitrary ceiling upon in-
creases in the wage rate.
Throughout the industrialized sector of the economy, unions
are able to redirect money from that area which we loosely call
"'profit" into the area of wages and benefits. This becomes particu-
larly evident when we discard the nineteenth century concept of
profit as a return to ownership, and recognize that the preeminent
factor of production among large-scale enterprises in the latter half
of the twentieth century is not capital, but rather organized, collec-
tive intelligence; the "profit" which is the usual subject of discus-
sion is not necessarily in the form of dividends to stockholders, but
rather in the form of some type of return to the management of the
enterprise.' 4 High management salaries represent the most obvious
example of "profit" accruing to the managerial class. However,
another avenue of "profit" which management traditionally seeks
to maximize is upward mobility for upper-middle echelon manage-
ment members themselves.'" Any type of corporate expansion
constitutes a "profit" to management, as expansion inevitably
leads to additional high paying jobs, higher status, and more op-
portunities for rapid advancement. While expansion may lead to
higher "profits" for stockholders in the long run, in the short run
profits are seldom reflected in increased dividends and only capri-
ciously reflected in capital gains. Although the stereotype of class
warfare in economic enterprises occurs between labor and owners,
a more accurate version in the modern economy depicts warfare
between workers who want profits to be used for immediate in-
creases in wage benefits and management who want profits to be
used to finance corporate expansion internally. Lower wages give
management more money for internal financing of corporate ex-
pansion. The stockholders are very much like "wingless flies in the
hands of small boys"-although perhaps one must concede that in
the long run, successful expansion will reflect moderate increases
in stock values and dividends.
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The question remains, however, how labor unions can raise
wages above increases in productivity without suffering an adverse
effect upon employment. The Washington lawyers who staff con-
gressional committees are accustomed to hearing a veritable del-
uge of testimony alleging that every increase in the minimum wage
immediately precipitates a curtailment in the level of employ-
ment. It is well documented that this is true in some industries,'
6
at least in the short run. A distinction must be drawn, however,
between capital-intensive industries and labor-intensive indus-
tries. Capital-intensive industries are those in which capital is the
predominant factor of production, e.g., the automobile and steel-
making industries. Labor-intensive industries are those in which
labor constitutes the predominant factor of production, such as the
textile and health care industries. When one talks about employees
subject to the minimum wage, one is concerned almost universally
with labor-intensive industries.
It is interesting to note that classical marginal productivity
theory as developed in the latter part of the nineteenth century
evolved at a time when all industries were essentially labor-
intensive. Probably no other economic theory, with the exception
of supply and demand, has so insinuated itself into the public
domain as marginal productivity analysis. While it sets forth a
general case which is still applicable to most of the underdeveloped
world, and even to certain broad segments of the American
economy, marginal productivity theory must be substantially
modified to make it descriptive in any way of the industrialized
sector of the American economy. Economic models are notoriously
unrealistic, and even their most ardent defenders recognize that
they are at best merely a partial explanation of reality. Neverthe-
less, it is possible to explain exactly where wage-price guidelines
went awry by updating the marginal productivity model which, in
its primitive form, led policy makers astray. The theory becomes
explanative again when we establish what I shall call "the general
case" for the industrialized sector.
II. THE GENERAL CASE FOR MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY IN THE
INDUSTRIALIZED SECTOR
Marginal productivity theory, as it is usually taught in inter-
, A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF WORK AND PAY, 66-72 (1973). See also R. PERL-
MAN, LABOR THEORY, 144-54 (1969).
9
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mediate and advanced economics classes, postulates that an em-
ployer will not pay a worker more than that worker brings into the
firm, and, further, that workers will be hired until the wage of the
last man hired exactly equals what that man produces for the firm.
In the classical model, capital and land are always held constant,
and under these conditions, a smooth upward sloping and then
downward sloping marginal physical product (MPP) schedule for
labor is hypothesized (Figure I). Stated simply, marginal physical
product is the increase in total output resulting from the addition










In order to determine the wage rate, this marginal physical
product schedule is then multiplied by the marginal revenue (MR)
schedule (derived indirectly from the product demand schedule
and directly from the total revenue schedule, and equal to the
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holding the quantity of capital constant) to give the marginal reve-
nue product (MRP) schedule, which is also the schedule of possible
wages (W) and the demand schedule for labor. Consequently, ac-
cording to classical theory, any attempt to raise wages without
productivity increases will result in a curtailment of employment,
because the equilibrium between the wage rate and the marginal
revenue product cannot be maintained at the higher wage level.
This is demonstrated in Figure I, where in moving from wage W1
to wage W2, the employment equilibrium moves from N1 to N2
(where N stands for number of workers). This theory obviously
fails to explain why wage rates in the competitive, as opposed to
oligopolistic, industrial sector can be raised without an increase in





General Slope of the Classical
Marginal Revenue Product Curve,
i.e., MPP x MR = MRP _
W2- - - - - ------- - - - -- Demand for Labor






Language has more than a passing role in forming our thought
patterns, and, therefore, the more precise the language used to
express an idea, the more persuasive the presentation of that idea
becomes. The very basic language of economics consists of repeti-
tive diagrams expressing fundamental economic concepts, and it
follows that anything that can be expressed in those diagrams will
11
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have greater conceptual force than less structured verbal analysis
or description. This section will demonstrate errors in the general
case postulated by classical marginal productivity theory. These
errors will be shown by the use of more descriptive modifications
of the simplest diagrams which traditionally have been used to
demonstrate the classical result.
The fundamental error in applying the classical model to the
industrialized sector is one of assumption. In the classical theory,
marginal physical product schedules are conceived as continuous
mathematical functions when capital and land are held constant;
however, for the industrial sector it is unrealistic both to hold other
factors constant and to conceive of the marginal revenue product
schedule, which also is the demand schedule for labor, as a contin-
uous function. What, for example, is the marginal productivity of
a second man on a tractor? Is it not close to zero? One would think
so in any normal operation if the tractor is used only during day-
light hours. What is the marginal productivity of a second secre-
tary on a typewriter? Is it not also close to zero, unless we assume
that shift work is economical? Even with shift work the same phen-
omenon of near-zero marginal product arises after three eight hour
shifts. In theorizing about an advanced industrial society, it is
unrealistic to hold all other factors constant, because for every
scale of capital there exists only one efficient work force. In effect
then, at all points on a real production function, capital and labor
effectively dovetail.'7
The marginal productivity of labor schedule in any capital-
intensive industry may be depicted by Figure I, as a discontin-
uous function in which both capital and labor are measured on the
X-axis, thus taking into account the complementary nature of
capital and labor. The productivity per last laborer hired at any
given scale of capital is measured on the Y-axis. The presence of
dots rather than a smooth curve indicates that labor in excess of
the amount complementary to capital at a given capital scale will
add nothing to production, while a curtailment of labor at one
output scale will not permit a discrete reduction in production,
but it will necessitate withdrawal to the next lower output scale.
There is no relevant area on a real assembly line in which labor
can be changed and capital held constant to produce small re-
ductions in output.
"1 In production and resource allocation theory this phenomenon is demon-
strated by right angle isoquants.
[Vol. 79
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IThe graph above assumes increasing and theni
(decreasing returns to total scale of enterprise. j
Figure III
The principle of discontinuity applies to any team of men
complementary to capital equipment. A United States Army 155
millimeter howitzer (to refer to an industry with which many adult
males have a passing acquaintance) requires a certain number of
men for its efficient combat operation on a 24-hour basis and if any
are added they can "goldbrick" all day; if any are subtracted, the
crew cannot operate efficiently for sustained periods in combat.
One gun requires one crew, and while we can hypothesize the ad-
vantages of a relief crew in a world of inordinately cheap labor, an
adequately low wage rate to permit such a crew is not within the
relevant range.
As capital and labor are completely complementary in an in-
dustrial situation, the classical model must be expanded to look
concurrently at the scale of capital. Of course in labor-intensive
argiculture and in some of the service industries, where the capital-
13
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labor ratio is low, the classical assumption of a continuous function
is more accurate. But accuracy in this labor-intensive sector does
not negate the conclusion that capital must be considered in any
industrial model portraying high capital to labor ratio characteris-
tics. Furthermore, industries with these characteristics are usually
unionized. Experience, in fact, indicates that unions have had the
least success in low wage, labor-intensive industries.'"
At this point the objection can be raised that while the discon-
tinuous function may be applicable, labor costs are an integral part
of long run average costs, and that as long as we are constrained
by a supply and demand price-setting mechanism, the raising of
labor costs will necessitate an increase in price, a decline in de-
mand, and a necessary curtailment of output and the number of
workers employed. This analysis is correct in its broadest implica-
tions. However, within the relevant range of labor-management
wage negotiations, rising costs will probably not determine em-
ployment. This conclusion follows if we again change only slightly
the classical assumptions and envisage a long run average cost
curve, not as a smooth continuous function, but rather as another
discontinuous function defined by points whose positions are dic-
tated by differing scales of capital. For not only is labor highly
complementary to capital, but also capital is complementary to
capital. Figure IV shows the conception of the long run average
cost curve (LAC) which is implicit in the classical marginal prod-
uctivity theory analysis. Line DD indicates the demand schedule
for the product, and line MR indicates the marginal revenue de-
rived from each unit sold. As I have already indicated, marginal
revenue is one of the factors used to derive the marginal revenue
product schedule, or demand schedule for labor. MPP x MR -
MRP.
The isolated coordinants (dots) in Figure V, on the other hand,
show a far more realistic LAC schedule, because production can be
carried on efficiently only at certain points where there are com-
plete "systems" of capital. Of what value, for example, is half an
assembly line? The marginal cost curve, i.e., the addition to total
cost resulting from the production of one more unit, then also
becomes realistically defined by a series of points. (Note that the
oligopolistic demand schedule, a line DD sloping downward to the
right rather than a competitive demand schedule which for any
given producer would be parallel to the horizontal axis, is shown,
'" L.G. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS, 412-28 (5th ed.
1964). Cf. J. BARBASH, THE PRACTICE OF UNIONISM, 17 (1956).
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because the general case of unionized industries probably conforms
much more often to the oligopolistic rather than to the competi-
tive model. The LAC schedule is not tangent to the DD line be-
cause it is assumed that there will be substantial barriers to entry
into the industry.)
It is logical that if the long run average cost schedule is discon-
tinuous because of the necessity of adding large amounts of capi-
tal, if any capital is to be added at all, then the only relevant
portions of the marginal revenue curve are those points describing
revenue derived from the output of each practical plant scale used
to optimum capacity. The dots in Figure V along the marginal
revenue curve correspond to these relevant points. It is these points
that should be used to derive the marginal revenue product curve,
and if we multiply these discontinuous points by the values repre-
sented by the series of points in Figure I (which indicate marginal
productivity defined only where there is an efficient scale of capital
complementary to a given work force) we define a marginal reve-
nue product (MRP) curve which is itself discontinuous, as de-
picted in Figure VI.
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: Dashed lines are merely to aid visualization ,
" only the dark points are relevant
Figure V
Once it is conceded that discontinuity characterizes the com-
ponent parts of the marginal revenue product function far better
than continuity, it is possible to describe the collective bargaining
process and the "bargained" wage rate with traditional theoretical
tools. Let us look at Figure VI and assume that when bargaining
begins the wage rate is W, which intersects the marginal revenue
product function at R3, a dot corresponding to the number IH mix
of labor and capital. Under certain circumstances, it will still be
possible for a labor union to raise wage rates, say to wage W2,
without causing a curtailment of employment. As long as the total
revenue (TR) derived from production at output HII, less the fixed
costs (FC) of production and the total new wage bill (W2) at out-
put IH is greater than the total revenue at output II, less the total
fixed costs (FC), plus the total new wage bill (W2) obtained at
[Vol. 79
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output II, then no workers will be discharged despite the wage
increase. In symbolic form we can say: if
[TR, -(FCin + TW)] [TR,- (FCi + TW,)]













Ci Cii C,,, Civ Cv Cvi Capital
N1  N2 N N N. N; Labor
Figure VI
It can easily be seen that there is an area of play between W,
(equilibrium at output R3) and W3 (equilibrium at output R,) in
which wages can be raised without the dire consequences that the
orthodox marginal productivity approach has always predicted.
The boundaries of this area of play will be determined by the shape
of the discontinuous marginal revenue product function and by the
short term mobility of resources. It is quite possible that the area
of play, which is mathematically defined by the shape of the par-
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ticular marginal revenue product curve, can be exceeded because
of the inability of resources to move within any relevant time pe-
riod, even though these resources may not, strictly speaking, be
inextricably complementary.
In the short run it is generally conceded that resources are not
mobile, and although economists talk a great deal about cross
elasticities of substitution between labor and capital, actual sub-
stitution in the plant is such a long term eventuality that it has
very little to do with routine contract bargaining. The higher the
fixed charges which cannot be recouped, the greater will be the
range of play in which labor can reallocate profits between man-
agement and labor.
Short run analysis appears to be the only relevant analysis in
the area of wages. The long run is at best uncertain, and any ceteris
paribus long run projection of substitution effects fails to consider
so many factors as to be almost worthless. Such factors as in-
creased demand, increased labor productivity resulting from better
education, and improved capital efficiency should all be con-
sidered in any realistic model. The ultimate conclusion of classi-
cal marginal productivity analysis that wages cannot be raised
beyond a certain point without curtailing employment remains
unchanged; sufficient wage increases necessitate a shift to a lower
scale of production. However, in ordinary negotiations this ulti-
mate conclusion is not usually relevant, and should not be a factor
in designing wage-price controls.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE GENERAL CASE
At this point it is possible to make some observations about
the "general" case. This general case postulates a certain negotiat-
ing spectrum, the range of which depends upon the capital to labor
ratio. The greater the capital component relative to labor, the
greater the range in which labor can raise wages without decreasing
employment. In such labor-intensive areas as agriculture and the
service trades the discontinuous function is less descriptive. The
farmer who is accustomed to using cheap labor may quickly find
it unprofitable to operate his farm if he is compelled to pay his
labor higher federal minimum wages.
In the agricultural example, it is necessary to realize that
much of the profit to be gained is a "return to labor." Without
becoming Marxian, it can be said that profit often comes to an
entrepreneur by buying cheap labor, organizing it for production,
[Vol. 79
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and selling the product dearly. Whether we characterize this as a
return to another's labor or as a return to the entrepreneur's skill
is a question more for philosophy than economics. A large increase
in the cost of the profit-producing agent will greatly lower the
profit. However, in a labor-intensive industry, the profit-producing
agent is a combination of managerial talent, technological innova-
tion, research and development, capital investment, and labor.
The returns to all of these factors are flexible in terms of the inter-
nal accounting of the firm. In such labor-intensive industries it is
possible to raise wages, lower profit (as expansively defined in the
early part of this article), and still not change the level of employ-
ment. The income to the non-labor factors of production will be
lower than it was before the wage increase, but still higher than it
would be if production were moved to the next lower output point.
The conclusion, therefore, is that the wage-price controls were
unmindful of the negotiating range which has been demonstrated
above. By establishing an arbitrary wage increase limit exactly
equal to industry-wide increases in productivity, the controls
locked labor into the same relative "share of the pie" that it had
on the day when the controls became effective. Accordingly, in an
industry which had historically devoted a large proportion of its
profits to corporate expansion, wage-price controls suddenly made
that allocation of profit non-negotiable. In addition, when one
employs a broad definition of "profit" and recognizes the factor of
management salaries as an element of "profit," one sees that there
is yet another area of negotiation which is foreclosed. While labor,
in general, is locked into definitely ascertainable wage rates, easily
regulated by virtue of assignments to fairly definite repetitive
functions, management salaries can always be raised in conjunc-
tion with increased responsibility. Corporate expansion provides
manifold opportunities to create jobs with increased responsibility
and, accordingly, to a large extent places management salaries
outside of the wage-price control perimeters.
The new marginal productivity model for the general case in
the industrialized sector implies that any future attempt at estab-
lishing a national wage-price policy must take seriously labor's
claim that unions do indeed redistribute the wealth in favor of
wage earners and away from the other factors of production, most
particularly capital and organized management. Accordingly, no
hard and fast rule that wages must increase only in direct propor-
tion to productivity increases is in any sense a workable principle
from the point of view of organized labor.
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Whatever structure we envisage for implementing direct con-
trols must be capable of incorporating value judgments with regard
to "profits"; i.e., alternatively determining the advisability of dis-
tributing increased profits among workers for immediate consump-
tion, investing profits for internally financed expansion, paying
profits in management salaries, or distributing profits to stock-
holders. Past experience suggests that this is almost an impossible
task throughout the entire economy, and one that quite probably
should not be undertaken. However, the question of what can be
done still must be answered because the alternative of a monetary
approach appears inevitably to precipitate a recession, while over-
all wage-price controls appear unworkable.
IV. THE "THEORY OF THE SECOND BEST" APPLIED
The tentative answer to the question is that although we can-
not achieve a perfect solution through either a monetary approach
or total wage-price regulation, we can follow sound economic
theory and strive for some "second best" solution that provides an
acceptable level of regulation, an acceptable level of resource
allocation distortion, an acceptable level of unemployment, and an
acceptable level of inflation. 9
As the greatest inflationary bias in the private sector is im-
posed upon the economy by oligopolistic industries in which both
labor and management are capable of exploiting inelastic demands
in the product market, the answer is probably to regulate only the
largest and most influential oligopolistic industries. This would
place them, to a large extent, in the same position as public utili-
ties which we have regulated fairly successfully during the past few
decades. While regulation of some industries, without correspond-
ing regulation of the rest of the economy inevitably produces dis-
tortion in resource allocation because of interference with the price
mechanism, that distortion would be a reasonable cost for reducing
inflation to an average of four or five percent, which experience in
the 1950's and early 1960's indicated to be an acceptable level. It
is a general belief among economists that once one sector of the
economy is regulated, the entire economy must be regulated be-
cause the price system no longer works efficiently. In spite of that
fact, an inefficient price system combined with an acceptable level
" Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REVIEW OF
ECONOMIC STUDIES 11-33 (1956-57).
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of inflation is probably preferable to total regulation with both its
political costs in terms of freedom and economic costs in terms of
even greater distortion in resource allocation as a result of incom-
petent regulation.
Although in the oligopolistic industries which will be regu-
lated, labor will be displeased with the curtailment of its power to
raise prices and wages (in concert with management) by exploiting
inelasticities in the product demand schedule, it can be reasonably
argued that because wages are already so high in oligopolistic in-
dustries compared to wages for similar work in other industries,
regulation would become fairly acceptable within a short period of
time. This limited regulation produces no greater reduction in
labor prerogatives than is associated with employment in the high
wage public sector. Once the wage-price spiral is broken in areas
such as automobiles, steel, rubber tires, transport and other simi-
lar industries, we should expect substantially less inflationary
pressure in the sectors of the economy that approach a competitive
situation. While we will have inflation, it should remain at an
acceptable level.
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